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IS LADIES’ NIGHT REALLY SEX DISCRIMINATION?:
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAWS, DE MINIMIS
EXCEPTIONS, AND STIGMATIC INJURY
Jessica E. Rank ∗

De minimis non curat lex: the law does not concern itself with trifles.

1

On June 17, 1998, David Gillespie sought free admission into the
2
Coastline Restaurant (“Coastline”) in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. It was
“Ladies’ Night” at Coastline, and the bar offered free admission and
reduced prices to women, while men were charged a five-dollar cover
3
charge and regular prices for drinks. Mr. Gillespie requested to be
charged the discounted price, but because he was not a woman, his
4
request was accordingly denied. He paid the five-dollar cover charge
5
and entered the bar. Five days later, Mr. Gillespie filed a complaint
with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights, alleging that Coastline
had engaged in impermissible reverse discrimination in violation of
his rights under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”),
6
a public accommodations statute.
In June 2004, the Division on Civil Rights agreed with Mr.
Gillespie. Although finding that the “minimal differences between
the men’s charge . . . and the women’s [charge] . . . do not constitute
the kind of ‘personal hardships’ or ‘menaces [to] the institutions and
foundation of a free democratic State’ to which the Legislature
intended the LAD to apply,” the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
∗
J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001,
Trinity College.
1
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004).
2
Gillespie v. J.C.B.C. Inc., No. CRT 2579-03, 2004 WL 1476932, at *1 (N.J.
Admin. June 10, 2004).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (West 2005).
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nevertheless held that the discounts violated the LAD because the
7
LAD did not provide for a de minimis defense to discrimination.
The decision by the Division on Civil Rights sparked controversy
8
9
and a national, as well as international, media backlash to the
proposition that ladies’ night is discriminatory towards men. The
Governor of New Jersey called the decision “bureaucratic
10
nonsense,” and he advised the State Attorney General that the civil
rights division had better things to do than consider an anti-ladies’
11
night claim.
Subsequently, the New Jersey Legislature drafted a bill, currently
pending in the State Senate, to amend the LAD to include a de
12
minimis defense.
The bill states that “[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of the ‘Law Against Discrimination,’ . . . to the contrary,
the holder of a plenary retail consumption license . . . may charge de
minimis differential pricing for alcoholic beverages and offer other
special discounts to patrons based on sex, provided that such pricing
13
is for economic reasons only.”
7

Gillespie, 2004 WL 1476932, at *7 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West
2005)).
8
E.g., Steve Chapman, Editorial, Ladies’ nights and the “cancer of discrimination,”
BALT. SUN, June 8, 2004, at 13A [hereinafter “Chapman, Editorial”] (“American
history holds numerous examples of discrimination that are thoroughly malignant.
This is not one of them . . . . There are no victims [here].”); DeWayne Wickham,
“Ladies Night” Ban in NJ Sends the Wrong Message, USA TODAY, June 8, 2004, at 21A
(arguing that public accommodation laws were enacted in response to mean-spirited,
racist practices that stand in sharp contrast to ladies’ night); Jeffrey Page, Glasses of
Scorn Raised to Ladies Night Killjoy, RECORD (NJ), June 9, 2004, at L1 (arguing that
ladies’ night has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory economic motive). “When there’s
[lively] social interaction . . . patrons have a habit of returning even when it’s not
ladies night.” Id.
9
E.g., David Usborne, Pandora in America, INDEPENDENT (UK), June 14, 2004, at
12; Elizabeth Hodgson, New Jersey Puts the Fizz Back Into Ladies Night, NATIONAL POST
(Canada), June 19, 2004, at A15.
10
Charisse Jones, Many Scoff at N.J. Ruling Over “Ladies Nights,” USA TODAY, June
4, 2004, at 3A.
11
Andrea Cecil, College Park Café Could Become First Place in Md. to Offer “Skirt
Night,” DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), June 4, 2004.
12
A. 3005, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004).
13
Id. (June 14, 2004 reprint showing changes made by Assembly Judiciary
Committee), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/A3500/3005_R1
.htm. The amendments made by the Assembly Judiciary Committee changed the
term “different prices” to “de minimis differential pricing,” removed age as an
exception to the differential pricing exceptions proposed by the bill, and added the
last clause of the bill, stating that the pricing must be “for economic reasons only.”
Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee submitted a statement to clarify that age was
removed from the bill because age, unlike sex, is not a prohibited category in the
public accommodations statute, and thus the reference to age was “superfluous.”
A. 3005, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (November 8, 2004 statement issued by the Senate
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The statement of legislative purpose, which accompanied the
bill, explained the intent behind the bill:
This bill would allow bars and restaurants to offer free
admission and discounted drink prices to female patrons on socalled “ladies nights.” Specifically, the bill authorizes holders of a
plenary retail consumption license to charge different prices for
alcoholic beverages and offer other special discounts to patrons
based on gender . . . .
The Director of the Division on Civil Rights recently held that
a restaurant offering gender-based priced differentials was in
violation of the State Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The
purpose of this bill is to clarify that such price differentials do not
constitute discrimination under the LAD.
In the highly competitive bar and restaurant business,
establishments which sponsor theme nights, such as “Ladies
Night” or “Mens Night,” clearly have a legitimate commercial goal
of increasing patronage. Such de minimis price differentials
14
should not be construed as gender . . . discrimination.

Gender-based pricing has been a source of debate in our
15
country, and the issue is complicated further by the lack of a
national standard to address gender discrimination claims. The
United States did not include sex as a protected class in Title II of the
16
which is the federal public
Civil Rights Act of 1964,
17
accommodations law.
In addition, allegations of gender-based
pricing often arise from the actions of private businesses, and as such
are not subject to the “state action” doctrine under the Fourteenth
18
Gender discrimination in places of public
Amendment.
accommodation is, therefore, largely an issue left to the states. In this
Judiciary Committee), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/A3500/
3005_S2.pdf; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2005).
14
A. 3005, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (June 10, 2004 introduction of bill in
Assembly), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/A3500/3005_I1.htm.
15
See, e.g., Civil Rights — Gender Discrimination — California Prohibits Gender-Based
Pricing — Cal. Civ. Code. S 51.6 (West Supp. 1996), 109 HARV. L. REV. 1839, 1839 (1996)
(“Differential pricing of services is one of America’s last remaining vestiges of formal
gender-based discrimination.”); Joyce L. McClements & Cheryl J. Thomas, Public
Accommodations Statutes: Is Ladies’ Night Out?, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1605, 1618 (1986);
Heidi C. Paulson, Ladies’ Night Discounts: Should We Bar Them or Promote Them?,
32 B.C. L. REV. 487, 528 (1991) (arguing that ladies’ night promotions encourage
paternalistic attitudes toward women and encourage stereotypes of both men and
women).
16
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
17
Id.
18
See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (holding that
the granting of a liquor license to a private club is not sufficient state action to
implicate the Fourteenth Amendment).
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absence of a national standard, many states have enacted “public
accommodations statutes” to ensure free and equal access to
19
accommodations. Cases related to sex-based price differentials are
20
generally brought under such statutes.
Public accommodation
statutes vary from state to state in terms of breadth of coverage and
21
the degree to which courts will enforce their requirements.
The issue of gender-based pricing has generated a split of
opinion among the courts in how to interpret their respective public
22
23
24
25
accommodations statutes.
California, Florida, Pennsylvania,
26
27
Iowa, and Maryland have taken an all-or-nothing approach to
interpreting their respective anti-discrimination laws. These states do
not analyze price discrimination in terms of degree, but instead have
held that any gender-based price discrimination, regardless of severity
28
29
30
In contrast, Illinois, Washington, and
or motivation, is illegal.

19

See Marissa L. Goodman, Note: A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean,
Trustworthy . . . and Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV.
825, 829 (1999) (“Over the years, state public accommodation laws, rather than
federal public accommodation laws, have been the more effective tool in combating
discrimination.”).
20
See infra notes 39–108 and accompanying text.
21
Goodman, supra note 19, at 830 (“The breadth of state public accommodation
laws varies depending upon legislative definitions and judicial interpretations of what
constitutes a public accommodation.”).
22
See infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.
23
Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 204 (Cal. 1985) (barring a
promotional car wash discount to women under California’s Unruh Act).
24
City of Clearwater v. Studebaker’s Dance Club, 516 So.2d 1106, 1109 (Fla. App.
1987) (holding that club policy of allowing women into “Pink Ladies’ Club” at a bar,
which was a special membership that included discounted drink prices, was in
violation of local anti-discrimination ordinances).
25
Pa. Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 471 A.2d 941, 943 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984)
(holding that the practice of admitting women into “go-go bar” for free while
charging men one dollar was in violation of the Human Relations Act).
26
Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass’n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989) (holding that
because the Iowa Civil Rights Act did not provide de minimis defense based on
legitimate purpose, the practice of admitting women into a racetrack at a reduced
admission price violated the Act).
27
Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 506 A.2d 263, 267 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)
(affirming panel decision that “Skirt and Gown Night” discount violated the Human
Relations Act because it was “discriminatory subterfuge” and merely an extension of
ladies’ night).
28
See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text.
29
The Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n., 428 N.E.2d 735, 738
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the Illinois Dramshop Act’s anti-discrimination
provision barred only conduct that prohibited patronage, and thus discounts to
women did not violate the Act because discounts were intended to encourage female
patronage, rather than discourage male patronage).
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31

Michigan have engaged in a balancing of the alleged discrimination
with the motivations behind it and the likely effects. These states
have found no actionable discrimination where the price-based
discount was not accompanied by an improper motive to prohibit
32
patronage by one sex or the other.
New Jersey’s recent ruling is the first of its kind in any state for a
number of years. While the legal analysis comports with other states
that have strictly construed public accommodations laws, the ensuing
public backlash about a potential ban on ladies’ nights suggests that
33
such strict construction may be misplaced. Allowing a de minimis
exception to public accommodations statutes would serve an
34
important efficiency purpose.
The effort by the New Jersey
Legislature in creating a de minimis exception demonstrates a
willingness to allow for small exceptions to sexual discrimination laws
in order to focus time and resources on remedying the more serious
harms caused by sexual discrimination.
This Comment proposes that sex-based differential pricing in
the context of ladies’ night discounts should not be considered
actionable sex discrimination under state public accommodations
laws. Part I of this Comment examines case law and legislation
dealing with gender discrimination and further examines the
treatment given to sex-based differential pricing in a number of states
35
that have dealt with the issue. Part II provides a general overview of
36
Part III discusses the
de minimis exceptions in other contexts.

30

MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., 635 P.2d 683, 686 (Wash. 1981)
(holding that a ladies’ night promotion sponsored by a professional basketball team
was not violative of Washington’s LAD because complainant was not damaged, the
discount had the legitimate purpose of increasing overall patronage, and such
discounts were not the evils intended to be remedied by the statute).
31
Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 309 N.W.2d 615, 619 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that a lower membership fee charged to women was not
violative of public accommodations statute because use of facilities was not being
withheld from men); Magid v. Oak Park Raquet Club Ass’n, 269 N.W.2d 661, 663
(Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (same).
32
See infra notes 81–108 and accompanying text.
33
See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
34
Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 203 (1992) (“The law . . . should not
concern itself with all possible violations of moral rights, but should instead select for
prohibition those broad types of discrimination that are most likely to be immoral,
intrinsically or extrinsically, that are either likely to violate victims’ rights or to cause
a great amount of social harm . . . and that are least costly to detect and establish in
court.”).
35
See infra notes 39–108 and accompanying text.
36
See infra notes 109–75 and accompanying text.
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concept of stigmatic injury and compares gender-based differential
pricing with a total exclusion from a public accommodation, arguing
that price differentials based on legitimate economic motives are not
the “cancer of discrimination” sought to be remedied by public
37
accommodations laws. Finally, Part IV concludes that nominal price
differentials are, in fact, de minimis and should not constitute
38
actionable gender discrimination.
I.

CASE LAW/LEGISLATION CONCERNING SEX-BASED PRICING

The issue of sex discrimination in places of public
accommodation is one that has been left to the states. The federal
public accommodations law, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
bans discrimination solely on the grounds of race, color, religion and
39
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
national origin.
Amendment, though invoked often in recent years to grant
40
“intermediate scrutiny” to sex-based classifications, suffers a similar
41
fate, since it too requires state action. An individual state, however,
can reach both public and private behavior through legislation
42
enacted under its “police power.”
As a result, many states have
enacted public accommodations statutes, which prohibit
43
discrimination on the basis of sex in public accommodations.
Interpretation of these statutes has varied among the states, and has
resulted in a split of opinion specifically on the issue of sex-based
44
differential pricing. Courts that have held gender-based differential
pricing to violate public accommodations laws have almost universally
recognized that no actual harm was caused to the plaintiff; despite
this recognition, those courts have strictly construed the statutes to
45
In
prohibit any type of discrimination, regardless of severity.
comparison, courts that have held that differential pricing did not
violate public accommodations statutes have engaged in a balancing

37

See infra notes 176–213 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
39
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000); Chai R. Feldblum et al., Legal Challenges to All-Female
Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 171, 182–83 (1986).
40
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (holding that a state
must show exceedingly persuasive justification to exclude women from admission at
state-funded military academy).
41
See id. at 532.
42
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
43
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -49 (West 2005).
44
See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text.
45
See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text.
38
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of the alleged harm with the rights protected by the statute. These
courts have been more willing to acknowledge that economic motives
can be a legitimate reason for differential pricing and can be utterly
47
devoid of any invidious, discriminatory purpose.
A. States Prohibiting Gender-Based Differential Pricing
1.

California
48

In the 1985 case of Koire v. Metro Car Wash, the California
49
Supreme Court held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”),
California’s public accommodation statute, prohibited a number of
car washes and one bar from offering promotional discounts to
50
women without offering similar discounts to men. The Unruh Act
states that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free
and equal, and no matter what their sex . . . are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or
51
services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”
The court held that the Unruh Act did not apply solely to the
exclusion of persons, but also to unequal treatment that is the result
52
In support of this statement, the court
of a business practice.
referenced a number of extreme cases of racially-motivated, verbally
and physically abusive behavior towards patrons, including one
instance where a black woman seated at a soda fountain was slapped
53
and had a hot cup of coffee thrown at her by white employees.
Continuing, the court stated that it would only recognize an
exception to the Unruh Act when public policy strongly favors such
54
treatment. The court rejected the defendant bar owner’s argument
that encouraging men and women to socialize was a sufficiently
55
important social policy to warrant an exception to the Unruh Act.
In contrast to the bar owner’s argument, the court stated that strong
public policy supported eradication of sex discrimination in any
56
form. The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

See infra notes 48–80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81–108 and accompanying text.
707 P.2d 195, 203–04 (1985).
Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West Supp. 2004).
Koire, 707 P.2d at 203–04.
CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51.
Koire, 707 P.2d at 197.
Id. (citing Hutson v. The Owl Drug Co., 249 P. 524, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1926)).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 202.
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plaintiff was not injured in any way, and stated that the Unruh Act
provides that any “arbitrary sex discrimination by businesses is per se
57
injurious.”
2.

Pennsylvania
58

In Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Dobrinoff, a bar was
59
charged with a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
for exempting female patrons from the one-dollar cover charge on a
60
night when “go-go girls” were dancing at the bar. While the court
acknowledged that the price difference was temporary, and that it
“may well have been intended for purposes other than a desire to
61
oppress male customers,” the court nonetheless held that when a
place of public accommodation has “based the collection or
exemption of an admission charge solely upon a difference in
gender, having no legitimate relevance to the circumstances, then, as
a matter of law, there is a violation of the Human Relations Act’s
62
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.”
3.

Iowa

Iowa has also adopted a strict interpretation of its public
63
accommodations statute. In Ladd v. Iowa West Racing Ass’n, the
Supreme Court of Iowa found that a “Ladies Day” promotion at a
racetrack, where women were given free admission and discounted
prices on concessions, discriminated against men in the furnishing of
64
facilities and services in violation of Iowa’s Civil Rights Act. While
the court suggested that the discrimination caused no real harm, the
court noted that the statute did not provide a means for
distinguishing between promotional schemes that are accidentally
discriminatory and those that are purposely engaging in prohibited

57

Id. at 200. While California’s stance in 1985 was to broadly construe the Unruh
Act, some suggest that the application of the Act has been narrowed in subsequent
years. See Alison Rothi, Note and Comment, Changing Ideas About Changing Diapers,
25 WHITTIER L. REV. 927, 956 (2004) (stating that social policy concerns have been
considered less frequently by the current California Supreme Court in deciding cases
under the Unruh Act, resulting in a narrow interpretation of the Act).
58
471 A.2d 941 (1984).
59
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(i)(1) (West 1982) (current version at 43 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 2005)).
60
Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 471 A.2d at 942.
61
Id. at 943.
62
Id.
63
438 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1989).
64
Id. at 602.
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65

discrimination. The court therefore adhered to an interpretation of
the statute that did not require discriminatory intent, but mere
evidence of discrimination, and found that the promotion was invalid
66
under the statute.
4.

Maryland
67

In Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland considered an interesting scenario related to ladies’
night discounts. The owner of the Woodside Delicatessen had long
been holding ladies’ nights, but after a customer filed a complaint
claiming that the promotion violated a county ordinance, the owner
68
changed the promotion to “Skirt and Gown Night.” The promotion
entitled any patron who wore either a skirt or gown on Thursday
nights to receive a fifty-percent discount on the price of his or her
69
meal. An administrative panel considered the complaint and found
that the promotion violated the ordinance because it was a
70
“discriminatory subterfuge, merely an extension of Ladies’ Night.”
The panel found that while some men had worn skirts and gowns to
take advantage of the promotion, the majority of those arriving in
71
The panel further found that the
skirts and gowns were female.
practice would place an undue burden on men by requiring them to
obtain a skirt or gown, items not found in the typical male wardrobe,
72
While the court seemed to
in order to obtain the discount.
question the gravity of the burden placed on men in this case, it
nonetheless upheld the ruling of the panel, finding that the
promotion violated the ordinance in question because it made a
73
distinction on the basis of sex.

65

Id.
Id.
67
506 A.2d 263 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
68
Id. at 264.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 264–65.
71
Id. at 266.
72
Id. at 265–66. On appeal, the county court reversed the panel’s decision, but it
was ultimately overturned by the Court of Special Appeals, which held that the
county court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the administrative
panel. Id.
73
Peppin, 506 A.2d at 267 (1986).
66
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5.

Florida
74

In City of Clearwater v. Studebaker’s Dance Club, a Florida District
Court of Appeals found that a promotional membership, called the
“Pink Ladies Club,” offering discounted drink prices to women,
75
violated the City of Clearwater’s anti-discrimination ordinances.
Lawrence Liebling, a patron of Studebaker’s Dance Club, filed a
complaint with the Clearwater Community Relations Board
(“CCRB”) when his application for membership in the Pink Ladies’
76
Club was denied because he was a man. The CCRB found that the
club had violated Section 99.11 of the City of Clearwater’s Code,
which stated that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for
any . . . place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . sex . . .
of any person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny
to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or
77
privileges thereof, that are afforded to other customers . . . .” An
intermediate ruling overturned the decision of the CCRB, finding
78
that such discrimination was “innocuous.” The ruling of the CCRB
was ultimately reinstated by the Court of Appeals, however, which
held that the previous court’s opinion that the discrimination was
79
The Florida
innocuous was not a proper ground for decision.
District Court of Appeals did not undertake a consideration of the
80
gravity, or lack thereof, of the discrimination.
B. Gender-Based Differential Pricing Permitted
1.

Michigan

Two Michigan cases, Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Associates,
81
82
Ltd. and Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, found that a
reduced-price membership for women at a health club did not violate
83
the Michigan public accommodations statute. In Magid, the Court
of Appeals of Michigan determined that the Michigan public

74

516 So.2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 1108–09.
76
516 So.2d at 1107.
77
Id. at 1107–08 (citing CLEARWATER CODE OF ORDINANCES § 99.11 (1980)
(repealed 1999)).
78
City of Clearwater, 516 So.2d at 1009.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
269 N.W.2d 661 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
82
309 N.W.2d 615 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
83
Magid, 269 N.W.2d at 663; Tucich, 309 N.W.2d at 618–19.
75
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accommodations statute provided a civil cause of action only in
84
The court
instances of a “refusal or denial of accommodations.”
held that because defendants had alleged only a price difference, and
not a refusal or denial of accommodations, they failed to state a cause
of action and were not entitled to redress under the public
85
accommodations statute.
In Tucich, the court also found that there had been no denial of
86
The court analyzed the club’s advertising
accommodations.
materials and found nothing in the materials that stated or implied a
87
denial of services to men by the facility. Rather, the court found
that the price differential was designed to encourage membership
88
and make the club’s facilities more available to both sexes.
The
court noted that one of the motivations of the club was to encourage
women who did not work during the day to become members in
89
order to increase use of the club during daytime hours.
2.

Washington
90

In MacLean v. First Northwest Industries of America, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Washington held that a basketball team’s ladies’
night price-ticketing practices did not constitute prohibited sex
91
The plaintiff attended a Seattle Sonics basketball
discrimination.
game on a night when women were admitted for one-half the ticket
92
price. The plaintiff, who purchased tickets for himself and his wife
as well as for another couple, requested to be charged half-price for
93
all tickets, but was refused.
He subsequently brought an action
94
alleging that the price difference
under the state LAD,
95
Based on the
discriminated against him on the basis of sex.
stadium’s evidence that women generally constituted thirty-five
percent of attendance and the stadium wanted to increase overall
attendance, the court found that the stadium’s motive was a

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Magid, 269 N.W.2d at 663.
Id.
Tucich, 309 N.W.2d at 618–19.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Id. at 617.
635 P.2d 683 (Wash. 1981).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 684.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.60.030 (West 2002).
MacLean, 635 P.2d at 684.
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legitimate economic motive, rather than one based on a desire to
96
discriminate against men.
Further, the court held that the LAD did not recognize the
plaintiff’s claim because he was not denied access nor made to feel
97
unwelcome. The court did not agree with the plaintiff’s analogy to
a 1921 case in which an African-American man had been denied
access to his seat in a theater, since in that case, the man was clearly
98
Finally, the court
denied access and made to feel unwelcome.
noted that because the plaintiff was unable to show that this alleged
discrimination had harmed him in any way, he failed to state a valid
99
cause of action under the LAD.
3.

Illinois
100

In The Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission, an
Illinois appellate court distinguished the price differential and
motivations behind ladies’ night from prohibited forms of
101
The plaintiff brought the claim under the Illinois
discrimination.
Dramshop Act, which served in this instance as a public
accommodations statute in providing that “no licensee . . . shall deny
. . . any person the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges of any premises in which alcoholic
102
liquors are authorized to be sold.”
The court said that the crucial
question is whether “the price differential denies persons, not able to
103
The
obtain the lower price, the equal enjoyment of the facilities.”
court held that the patrons would only be denied equal enjoyment if
the bar’s policy intended to, or had the effect of, discouraging men
104
The court stated, however,
from patronizing the establishment.
that the price men were charged was the regular established price for
105
drinks and was not intended to discourage their patronage.
The
price that women were charged was reduced to a nominal sum for
106
the purpose of encouraging their patronage.
The court suggested
96

Id. at 648–85.
Id. at 685–86.
98
Id. at 686 (citing Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 194 P. 813 (1921)).
99
Id.
100
428 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. App. 1981).
101
Id. at 738.
102
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, par. 133 (1979) (current version at 235 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/6-17 (West 1993)).
103
The Dock Club, Inc., 428 N.E.2d at 738 (internal quotations omitted).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
97
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that to hold the statute to prohibit a promotional discount such as
ladies’ night would bar promotional discounts to any group, which
the court noted was a common practice by businesses to increase
107
patronage. Further, the court stated that the lack of litigation over
the offering of prices to different groups indicated that “no evil
108
sought to be remedied occurred here.”
II. DE MINIMIS EXCEPTIONS IN OTHER CONTEXTS
109

De minimis is defined as “of the least” or “trifling; minimal”
and a fact or thing that is “so insignificant that a court may overlook
110
it in deciding an issue or case.”
The concept of a de minimis exception to a law is not a novel
one; in fact, de minimis exceptions have been formally and
111
informally recognized in a number of other contexts.
Though
varied, these contexts contain a general theme that the law will not
recognize insignificant injuries, regardless of whether the literal
interpretation of the law would suggest that there has been an actual
violation. Gender-based price discrimination, particularly in the
context of ladies’ nights, should be subject to a de minimis exception.
A. De Minimis Criminal Infractions
The Model Penal Code includes a de minimis exception to its
112
provisions.
Section 2.12, titled “De Minimis Infractions,” provides
that:
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the
nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the
nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the
defendant’s conduct:
1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither
expressly negatived by the person whose interest was
infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law
defining the offense; or
2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an
extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction;
or
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004).
Id.
See infra notes 112–74 and accompanying text.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.12 (1962).
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3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot
reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in
forbidding the offense.
The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under Subsection (3)
113
of this Section without filing a written statement of its reasons.

The legislative history behind Section 2.12 suggests that its purpose is
114
to prevent “absurd applications” of the criminal law and to codify
the existing discretionary authority of prosecutors and grand juries to
115
choose whether or not to prosecute a criminal case.
Five jurisdictions, including New Jersey, have adopted Section
116
2.12.
In adopting Section 2.12, New Jersey made only one
substantive modification, changing the words “shall dismiss” to
117
“may dismiss.”
Dismissal of de minimis infractions is therefore
permissive, rather than mandatory, in New Jersey. Nonetheless, the
118
de minimis statute has been invoked on a number of occasions.
In State v. Zarrilli, a 20-year-old college student was charged with
underage consumption of alcoholic beverages on licensed premises
119
for consuming one sip of beer at a church fair.
Another patron at
the fair was the Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic
120
The Director witnessed the defendant, William
Beverage Control.
121
Zarrilli, taking a sip of beer from a cup purchased by a friend.
Subsequently, the Director signed a municipal court complaint

113

Id. (emphasis added).
Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the “De Minimis”
Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51, 52 (1997) (citing DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL PENAL
CODE, 39 A.L.I. Proc. 61, 105–08, 226–27 (1962)).
115
Pomorski, supra note 114, at 52.
116
The five jurisdictions include four states and the territory of Guam. HAW. REV.
STAT. § 702-236 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2-11 (West 1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312 (West 1998); GUAM CODE ANN.
tit. 9, § 7.67 (Westlaw through P.L. 28-037 (2005)).
117
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-11 (West 1995). The New Jersey statute also removes the
requirement under subsection (3) of the Model Penal Code that the court must file a
written statement of its reasons for finding that the charge would be contrary to
legislative intent. Id. It also adds a requirement that the prosecutor be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard, and a right to appeal. Id. In addition, New Jersey
vests the authority of dismissing the case in the “assignment judge,” rather than the
“Court.” Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.12 (1962).
118
See, e.g., State v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D.N.J. 1995); State v. Zarrilli, 523
A.2d 284, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); State v. Nevens, 485 A.2d 345, 348
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); State v. Smith, 480 A.2d 236, 241
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
119
Zarrilli, 523 A.2d at 285.
120
Id.
121
Id.
114
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122

charging Zarrilli with the offense.
The Superior Court of New
Jersey stated that the correct test in applying the de minimis statute is
to determine the risk of harm to society caused by a defendant’s
123
Applying the facts, the court found that the “harm to
conduct.
society caused or threatened by [the defendant’s] conduct was so
124
minimal as not to warrant the condemnation of a conviction.” The
125
complaint was dismissed on the grounds that it was de minimis.
126
In State v. Bazin,
the New Jersey District Court dismissed a
127
charge of harassment under the de minimis statute.
In a criminal
128
action brought by a private citizen, the citizen charged United
129
States Postal Service inspector Michael Bazin with harassment.
Bazin had been in the process of investigating a theft of $70,000 in
cash from the Trenton Post Office that occurred in May 1995, and
sought to conduct polygraph tests on workers who had been present
130
on the day of the theft.
One worker, Edgar Paulus, arrived for his
131
polygraph test with his union representative, Evette Utley-Williams.
Upon Williams’ advice, Paulus refused to take the test, and a 30132
minute argument with the defendant followed.
When Paulus and
Williams rose to leave, the defendant stated in a sarcastic manner, “I
want to thank you for all of your cooperation in this investigation.
133
Williams asked
Just remember, what goes around, comes around.”
Bazin if the statement was a threat and Bazin responded by slamming
134
Williams then asked Bazin, “So,
his office door, hitting Williams.
you are going to be violent, too?” and Bazin responded, “I would if I
135
could.”
The court found that, though Bazin’s statements were not
122

Id.
Id.
124
Id.
125
Zarilli, 523 A.2d at 289.
126
912 F. Supp. 106 (D.N.J. 1995).
127
Id. at 114.
128
The United States Attorney’s Office, the Hamilton Township Prosecutor, the
Mercer County Prosecutor, and the New Jersey Attorney General’s office all refused
to prosecute the case. Id. at 109. Complainant retained the firm of Stark & Stark to
prosecute the action on behalf of the State of New Jersey. Id.
129
Bazin was also charged with simple assault, but that charge did not factor into
the court’s discussion of the de minimis statute. Id.
130
Id.
131
Bazin, 912 F. Supp. at 109.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. Williams brought assault charges, alleging that the slamming of the door
was meant to cause her physical harm. Id. at 109. The de minimis exclusion in this
case concerns only the harassment charges. Id. at 115.
135
Id. at 109.
123
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professional or pleasant, they did not rise to the level of
136
In fact, the court noted, his statement that he would
harassment.
use violence “if he could” demonstrated that he did not intend to
137
violate the law.
The court granted the defendant’s motion to
138
dismiss the harassment charge on de minimis grounds.
B. De Minimis Copyright Infringement
Copyright law also includes a de minimis standard, applied in
139
Music sampling is the practice of
the area of “music sampling.”
140
using previous sound recordings to create new music, and it is
141
particularly common in the rap and hip-hop genres. The issue that
arises with music sampling is the question of how much of an existing
song can be used before the sampling has infringed on the existing
copyright. Generally, if a plaintiff has a copyright in a work, such as a
song, any expression substantially similar to that work constitutes an
142
infringement.
If the use of the copyrighted work is de minimis,
however, or so trivial “as to fall below the qualitative threshold of
143
144
In determining
substantial similarity,” the use is not actionable.
whether the use meets the qualitative threshold of substantial
similarity, courts will look to whether the portion appropriated was
“much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, or the heart of
145
the work.”
C. De Minimis Exception for Overtime Salary Owed to Employee
A de minimis rule is also recognized in the context of overtime
146
147
salary.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employers are
136

Id. at 114.
Bazin, 912 F.Supp. at 114.
138
Id. at 115.
139
David S. Blessing, Note, Who Speaks Latin Anymore?: Translating De Minimis Use
for Application to Music Copyright Infringement and Sampling, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2399, 2409–10 (2004); Josh Norek, “You Can’t Sing Without the Bling”: The Toll of
Excessive Sample License Fees on Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Need for a Compulsory
Sound Recording Sample License System, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004).
140
Blessing, supra note 139, at 2403.
141
Norek, supra note 139, at 86–87 (discussing the development of music
sampling in rap and hip-hop music).
142
Blessing, supra note 139, at 2407.
143
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)).
144
Norek, supra note 139, at 87.
145
Id. at 88 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)).
146
Amanda M. Riley, The De Minimis Rule: Trifles of Time, 45 ORANGE COUNTY LAW.
18, 18 (Nov. 2003).
137
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required to pay overtime salary to employees who work beyond a
148
When the extra time is a matter of a few
forty-hour work week.
minutes, however, courts have held that such time is de minimis and
149
need not be recorded. The United States Court of Appeals for the
150
Ninth Circuit, in Lindow v. United States, established a balancing test
151
In that
to determine whether compensable time is de minimis.
case, employees had spent an average of seven to eight minutes
reading a log book and exchanging information with each other
regarding what had occurred on previous shifts, though their
employer had not required them to do so and the discussions did not
152
occur at regular times or intervals.
The court considered “(1) the
practical administrative difficulty of recording the additional time;
(2) the aggregate amount of compensable time; and (3) the
153
While taking into account the
regularity of the additional work.”
effect of denying an employee his pay, the test also considers the
154
difficulties of recording small amounts of time. On the other hand,
those difficulties are considered less important when the employee
has worked for a longer period of time beyond his scheduled work
hours, or when he has consistently worked a small amount of time
beyond his scheduled hours. Under the facts of Lindow, the Ninth
Circuit held that the amounts of overtime were too insignificant
when compared with the administrative burden of recording short
155
periods of time.
D. De Minimis Environmental Law Violations
A de minimis standard has also been established by Congress
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
156
and Liability Act (CERCLA). Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to
147

29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq. (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000).
149
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946) (“When the
matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the
scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded.”); see, e.g., Lindow v.
United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 1984).
150
738 F.2d 1057.
151
Id. at 1063.
152
Id. at 1060.
153
Id. at 1063.
154
Id.
155
Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1063.
156
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (2000); see Monica Shah Desai, Disposing of United
States v. CDMG Realty Co.: The Case Against the Application of CERCLA Liability for De
Minimis Disturbances of Pre-Existing Contamination, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 200, 203–11
(1997).
148
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157

clean up leaking, inactive, or abandoned hazardous waste sites.
The theory behind CERCLA is restitution: those responsible for
causing the release of hazardous substances should pay the costs of
158
CERCLA imposes, in general, strict liability on those
cleanup.
159
responsible for the release of hazardous substances.
Congress has, however, acknowledged that defendants who have
contributed a de minimis amount of contamination should be
160
treated differently than other CERCLA defendants.
For purposes
of settlement, defendants who have caused de minimis amounts of
contamination and who agree to settle with the government are
161
The purpose behind this provision
protected from certain claims.
is to provide an opportunity for de minimis contaminators to settle
their claims instead of engaging in protracted legal proceedings;
evidence showed that in many cases, such defendants were subject to
higher legal fees and other transactional fees than their ultimate
162
liability for cleanup at a given site.
The definition of de minimis
under CERCLA is not a fixed number; instead, a determination of
whether contamination is de minimis rests on a comparison with the
163
total amount of hazardous materials in the site.
E. De Minimis Employment Discrimination
The concept of de minimis discrimination has been recognized
164
Sex-based
in the employment discrimination context for decades.
157

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, as reauthorized and substantially amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); John C. Cruden, CERCLA Overview, SH093 ALI-ABA 555,
561 (2003). CERCLA was enacted in response to severe environmental and health
problems at abandoned toxic waste sites such as Love Canal in New York and Times
Beach in Missouri. Id.
158
Cruden, supra note 157, at 562.
159
Desai, supra note 156, at 203.
160
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (2000); Desai, supra note 156, at 208–09.
161
Desai, supra note 156, at 208–09.
162
Id. at 210–11.
163
Id. at 209–11;
[T]he President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement
with a potentially responsible party . . . if such settlement involves only
a minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned . . .
[and] (A) both of the following are minimal in comparison to other
hazardous substances at the facility: (i) The amount of hazardous
substances contributed by that party to the facility. (ii) The toxic or
other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by that party to
the facility.
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
164
Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L. J. 1121, 1122
(1998).
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differences in workplace dress and grooming codes are accepted as
165
permissible forms of discrimination. Generally, courts have upheld
dress and grooming codes that differentiate between male and
166
female employees.
An employer’s policy is likely to be upheld
167
when its rationale is nondiscriminatory and supported by facts.
Examples include employer’s public image, safety concerns,
enhancing employee morale and productivity, and conforming to
168
generally accepted community standards of dress and appearance.
Some scholars note a movement to broaden the scope of de
minimis exceptions in the context of employment discrimination
169
claims.
In light of an increasing volume of cases in the courts,
some of which are perceived as “frivolous,” there is a trend to limit
discrimination claims to those that have the most merit, and where
170
Many circuit courts have
an employee has truly suffered harm.
begun to require that, for a claim of discrimination to be actionable
171
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the plaintiff
demonstrate a materially adverse action or effect, in addition to
172
demonstrating the existence of discrimination itself.
Thus, an
employee must show that he or she suffered a tangible effect, usually
economic, in his or her employment as a result of the discrimination.
Essentially, the employee must have been fired or otherwise have lost
173
While the details of
wages, through a demotion or other action.
174
this developing doctrine are complicated and thus beyond the
scope of this Comment, the trend suggests that courts are willing to
165

White, supra note 164, at 1122, n.1 (noting that employers are permitted to
establish different dress and grooming standards without violating Title VII).
166
Marc Koonin, Avoiding Claims of Discrimination Based on Personal Appearance,
Grooming, and Hygiene Standards, 15 LAB. LAW. 19, 23 (1999); see, e.g., Willingham v.
Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975).
167
Koonin, supra note 166, at 21.
168
Id. at 21–23.
169
White, supra note 164, at 1124–25.
170
Id. at 1124 (stating that “courts are understandably reluctant to permit
disgruntled employees to make a case out of every workplace situation arguably
motivated by a worker’s race, sex, or complaints of discrimination”).
171
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). The Act prohibits employment discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Id.
172
White, supra note 164, at 1124.
173
See, e.g., Lederberger v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting
that a “purely lateral transfer” where the employee is not demoted in substance or in
form, does not constitute a materially adverse employment action).
174
White, supra note 164, at 1126 (noting that there is a “real and growing
disarray concerning which improperly motivated employment decisions are legally
actionable . . . [as well as] confusion over whether material adversity is a statutory
requirement or is only a necessary element for a prima facie case of disparate
treatment”).
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consider claims of discrimination only when plaintiffs can
demonstrate that they were tangibly and materially harmed by the
175
discrimination.
F.

Summary

As the above examples demonstrate, de minimis exceptions are
recognized in a number of contexts. Despite the varied subject
matter, the common theme running through these exceptions is that
an act will be considered de minimis when it fails to cause the harm
sought to be prevented by a particular law. As has been recognized
most recently in the employment discrimination context, limiting
recovery to when a person is tangibly harmed by the discrimination
serves an important efficiency purpose by limiting the number of
frivolous claims. Public accommodation laws, which were enacted to
curtail overt, hostile acts of discrimination, should not apply to
gender-based differential pricing when such pricing is the result of
legitimate, good-faith economic motives. A de minimis exception is
warranted in the context of ladies’ nights, because while they do
violate the literal interpretation of many public accommodation
statutes, the motive behind them is simply not what state legislatures
intended to prevent by enacting such laws.
III. STIGMATIC HARM AND GENDER-BASED DIFFERENTIAL PRICING
The injury asserted by plaintiffs such as David Gillespie is
essentially one of stigma. Assuming that the nominal difference
between the price a man would pay to attend a ladies’ night and the
price a woman would pay is, in fact, a de minimis injury, the
remaining claim is that the male plaintiffs are stigmatized on the
basis of their gender. This Part discusses whether a plaintiff may
successfully argue that he suffered a stigmatic injury as a result of
being denied a gender-based price discount, concluding that
stigmatic injury is not a viable claim.
Generally, male plaintiffs challenging ladies’ night argue that by
charging men more, an establishment is expressing that men are less
welcome, and is thus discriminating against men in the furnishing of
176
a public accommodation by treating men as second-class citizens.

175

Id. at 1124, 1126.
See Mark M. Hager, Essay: Sex in the Original Position: A Restatement of Liberal
Feminism, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 213 (1999) (stating that ladies’ night is
“innocuous fun” that could only be compared to real discrimination by “wooden
analogy”).
176
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This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed.
There is no
parallel comparison between an event such as ladies’ night, where
reduced prices for women are used as an incentive to increase female
patronage as well as overall patronage, and one where a group is
178
expressly excluded. Ladies’ night, since it does not discourage men
from attending, is nearly the opposite of what a “whites’ night” or
179
“blacks’ night” would mean.
Rather, ladies’ night is based on the
harmless observation that women are less likely to frequent bars than
180
men. Relying on basic economic notions of supply and demand,
bar and restaurant owners resort to discounts in order to increase
their overall number of customers.
A. Stigmatic Harm
Stigmatic harm occurs when a given act or policy stigmatizes a
person or group by sending a message that a difference renders that
181
person or group inferior.
It “implies more than merely being referred to by a racial epithet
or even the denial of a particular opportunity . . . . It involves
becoming a disfavored or dishonored individual in the eyes of society,
a kind of social outcast whose stigmatized attribute stands as a barrier
182
to full acceptance into the wider community.”
Stigma has most frequently been recognized and developed by
the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
jurisprudence. While the issue of stigmatic injury under public
accommodation statutes does not involve constitutional questions,
the concept serves as an analogy to explain why gender-based
differential pricing does not cause stigmatic harm.

177

Id. (“Ladies’ night disparages neither males nor females except under the most
contrived interpretation . . . . [S]ome men and women like going where it is easy to
meet.”).
178
Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (holding that total
exclusion of women from membership of organization violated public
accommodation statute and was not protected by constitutional right of expressive
association); see Chapman, Editorial, supra note 8, at 13A (arguing that ladies’ night is
not the result of a “deep-seated hostility toward men, perpetuating centuries of
oppression,” but instead exists because women are “generally less attracted to the bar
scene”).
179
Hager, supra note 176, at 182.
180
Joyce Howard Price, ‘Ladies Night’ Ruled Discriminatory: Bar Owners Contend Men
Benefit Most From Incentives to Women, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), June 3, 2004, at A12.
181
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2004).
182
Id. at 809.
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The seminal Supreme Court case addressing stigmatic harm is
183
Brown v. Board of Education.
In that case, the Court held that
racially segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause
184
because a separate education was inherently unequal.
In reaching
its conclusion, the Court relied on social science research discussing
185
The Court found that
the effect of segregation on black children.
the effect was severe, stating that “to separate [the children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
186
undone.” The exclusion of black children from the schools caused
grave harm by stigmatizing the children as less worthy.
In order to violate the Equal Protection Clause, a government
action must not merely run the risk of causing someone to feel
stigmatized, but it also must have a discriminatory motive or intent
187
Stigma also appears to presume that the person or
behind it.
group claiming stigmatization is actually part of a historically
188
disfavored group.
It is here that the male plaintiffs’ claims fail.
First, there is no evil intent or discriminatory motive behind genderbased discounts such as ladies’ night. In fact, quite the opposite is
189
Second, no case has identified plausible grounds as to how,
true.
and in what way, such plaintiffs were stigmatized. Rather, some
courts have recognized that no harm occurred as a result of the
190
discount, but nonetheless were bound by strict statutory wording.

183

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 495.
185
Id. at 494 & n.11.
186
Id. at 494.
187
Lenhardt, supra note 181, at 875 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643
(1993)). Shaw v. Reno described stigma as a result of an intentional race-based
classification. Id.
188
Lenhardt, supra note 181, at 850. The author compared hypothetical
situations in which a student is accused of only being admitted to Harvard because
she was black, as opposed to because she was white, or a legacy, or was from a certain
geographical region of the country. Id. He concluded that the accusation regarding
race carries the greatest impact because there is a presumption of black inferiority in
our society, whereas there is no such presumption regarding the other categories.
Id.
189
Hager, supra note 176, at 214 (stating that many men and women enjoy going
out where it is easy to meet, and arguing that ladies’ night disparages men under
only the most contrived interpretation).
190
See supra notes 7, 48–80, and accompanying text for a discussion of various
courts’ failure to find any true harm caused to male plaintiffs by ladies’ night
discounts.
184
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B. Gender-Based Differential Pricing Is Not Stigmatizing
191

In Koire v. Metro Car Wash, the California Supreme Court stated
192
that gender-based price discrimination is “per se injurious.”
The
problem, however, is that such pricing is not at all similar to other
forms of discrimination, making the blanket claim of injury difficult
to sustain. When comparing ladies’ night to an instance of total
exclusion from a public accommodation, the need for a de minimis
exception becomes clear; sex-based price discounts simply pale in
193
comparison to overt, hostile acts of discrimination.
194
In Gillespie, the ALJ found a violation of the LAD because the
bar discriminated against a person in the “furnishing of” a public
195
accommodation.
In support of this proposition, it cited two New
196
197
Jersey cases: Turner v. Wong and Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort.
These cases, however, are not parallel to the ladies’ night cases
because they involved outright denials of service and overt acts that
caused the plaintiffs to feel unwelcome, whereas the events in Gillespie
did not involve conduct intended to make any person or group feel
unwelcome.
In Franek, an eighty-three-year-old, wheelchair-bound woman was
198
The woman’s daughter
using the defendant’s recreational facility.
spoke with the facility’s operator in order to request access to a
separate entrance, and the operator stated that he did not “want
199
While the disabled woman did
those kind [sic] of people here.”
200
not hear the initial conversation, she later learned of the details.
Feeling unwelcome and unhappy to be at the facility, she and her
201
She never returned
daughter left earlier than they had intended.
202
to the facility and died before her case went to trial.
The Superior

191

707 P.2d 195 (1985).
Id. at 200.
193
McClements & Thomas, supra note 15, at 1618 (“The importance of a male not
being able to buy a drink, attend a basketball game, or get his car washed for the
same price as a female pales in comparison to someone not being able to obtain
housing or employment because of his race or sex.”).
194
Gillespie v. J.C.B.C. Inc., No. CRT 2579-03, 2004 WL 1476932 at *8
(N.J. Admin. June 10, 2004).
195
Id.
196
832 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
197
754 A.2d 1237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
198
Id. at 1239.
199
Id. at 1240.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
192
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Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that the statements
203
made by the operator violated the LAD. The court stated that
it is unquestionably a violation of the LAD for the owner or
operator of a public accommodation to tell a person, either
directly or indirectly, that his or her patronage is not welcome
because of a trait or condition which the LAD protects from
discriminatory action, even though use of the facility on the
204
particular occasion is not denied.

The court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
205
favor of the defendant.
In Turner, Delois Turner purchased a donut and a cup of coffee
206
When Turner complained that the
from Nancy Wong’s store.
donut was stale and requested a new one, Wong allegedly called
207
Turner a “black nigger from Philadelphia.”
Wong repeated the
phrase three or four times in front of the other customers, who were
all white, and then continued, yelling, “You black niggers come in
here, give me a hard time. White people don’t give me a hard time.
208
When Turner asked where she could
White people nice people.”
209
find a phone, Wong told plaintiff to get out of her store.
The
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, found that the
statements made by Wong were intended to force Turner to leave the
210
Relying on
store and to make her feel unwelcome to return.
Franek, the court stated that the protections of the LAD are not
limited merely to where there is an outright denial of the use of a
facility or the services thereof, but also to situations in which a
customer is discouraged from using a public accommodation because
211
Further, the court
of his or her protected status under the LAD.
stated that the “focal issue” in such cases is whether the defendant
acted with an “actual or apparent design to discourage present or
future use of the public accommodation by plaintiff on account of
212
[his or] her protected status.”
As in Franek, the court reversed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant,

203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Franek, 754 A.2d at 1243.
Id.
Id. at 1243–44.
Turner, 832 A.2d at 345–46.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id.
Turner, 832 A.2d at 356.
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and remanded for a factual determination of what Wong had actually
213
said.
When Turner and Franek are compared to Gillespie, a striking
difference is clear. The plaintiffs in Turner and Franek were made to
feel as if, based on their protected status, their present and future use
of a public accommodation was unwelcome. David Gillespie,
however, was not discouraged from patronizing Coastline. Because
gender-based pricing is not based on an animus toward one gender
or the other, it is not stigmatizing. It is not the type of harm that state
legislatures intended to remedy through the enactment of public
accommodations laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gender-based differential pricing, particularly in the context of
ladies’ night discounts, is de minimis and should not be considered
violative of public accommodation laws. The effort by the New Jersey
legislature to amend the LAD to recognize a de minimis exception
correctly recognizes that not all instances of discrimination should
form the basis for a legal challenge. The de minimis price
differences involved in gender-based discounts are similar to other
areas where de minimis exceptions have been recognized and
embraced. Most importantly, a de minimis exception would serve an
important efficiency purpose by reserving the statutory cause of
action under the LAD to those cases where actual discrimination has
occurred. Male plaintiffs such as David Gillespie have suffered no
tangible injury and have been wrongfully afforded a statutory cause of
action where there should be none. Public accommodation laws,
which were enacted to remedy instances of overt, hostile
discrimination against racial groups, should not be invoked in this
manner.

213

Id.

